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ABSTRACT 
This article studies legislation, regulations, and case law to analyze 
whether the Homeowners Loan Act, as well as other measures taken 
to stabilize federal thrifts in the last forty years, have served their 
original purpose.  It also examines the impact of federal intervention 
on states and homeowners and the role that federally-chartered 
institutions such as banks and savings and loan associations played 
in the 2008 market collapse.  Over the course of this analysis, 
particular attention is given to Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  This act has numerous goals 
including implementing stronger consumer protections, restoring 
state rights, and preventing another financial crisis, thereby avoiding 
the need for government funded recovery.  It is clear that federal 
regulators overstepped their bounds in order to preserve federal 
thrifts, infringed on the rights of states, and limited homeowner 
access to justice-all in the name of promoting market stability.  The 
evidence proves that federal intervention worsened the impact of the 
crisis.  This article concludes that federal thrifts no longer serve their 
original purpose and are no longer economically viable without 
preferential treatment from the federal government.  Since states are 
in the best position to protect homeowners and institutions do not 
need an incentive to engage in residential lending, it is in the best 
interest of all parties to eliminate the federal thrift charter. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In response to the worst economic crisis since the Great 
Depression,1 Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank,” “Dodd-Frank Act”).2  
Federal institutions played a significant role in causing this crisis, 
specifically the housing market collapse, by using preemption to block 
state efforts at addressing the financial meltdown.3  Dodd-Frank 
repealed the regulations mandating field preemption and eliminated the 
Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”), instead bringing the regulation of 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Remarks at the Swearing-In Ceremony, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100203a.htm. 
 2. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections 
of the U.S. Code). 
 3. Kurt Eggert, Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab: Dodd-Frank, 
Preemption, and the State Role in Mortgage Servicing Regulation, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 
171, 172–73 (2011); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT xxiii, 13, 111–12 (2011) [hereinafter CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT], available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. 
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thrifts under the control of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(“OCC”).4  The Act also created the Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection (“CFPB” or “Bureau”).5 
In the 1930s, Congress enacted the Home Owners’ Loan Act 
(“HOLA”)6 and created the federal thrift charter.7  Congress considered 
federal intervention necessary to the country’s recovery, and intended 
for these actions to stimulate the economy and provide a resource for 
home financing.8  Recently, HOLA has been the basis for removing 
cases brought by homeowners from state to federal court due to field 
preemption.9  After removal many homeowners’ claims are dismissed 
due to the lack of a comparable federal remedy, caused in part by the 
failure of the OTS to adopt consumer protection laws.10  Congress’ 
original intent was to create more sources for loans, not to usurp state 
power and restrict homeowner access to the courts.11  Dodd-Frank 
makes some effort to undo the impact of the OTS power grab by 
subjecting OCC regulations to conflict preemption.  Unfortunately, to 
date, courts have not applied conflict preemption and have instead relied 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111–203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521–22 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5412). 
 5. Dodd-Frank Act §1021(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511) (stating that the 
Bureau will draft federal consumer protection laws and monitor financial institutions of 
all varieties).  For more information on the Bureau, see CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). 
 6. Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA) §§ 1–14, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461–1468c 
(2006). 
 7. Home Owners’ Loan Act § 5 (authorizing the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
to issue charters for federal savings and loan associations).  A federal thrift, also known 
as a savings and loan, specializes in making mortgage loans and accepting savings 
deposits. 
 8. See infra Part II.A. for a discussion of the purposes underlying HOLA.  See 
also H.R. REP. NO. 73-210, at 1 (1933) (Conf. Rep.).  For a summary of the origination 
of HOLA and the federal government’s involvement in home finance, see Daniel 
Immergluck, Private Risk, Public Risk: Public Policy, Market Development, and the 
Mortgage Crisis, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 447, 453–59 (2009).   
 9. See 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 (2012). 
 10. See Patricia A. McCoy et. al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result 
of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1350 (2009) (noting 
the OTS did not issue formal regulations and opposed guidance from other agencies on 
nontraditional lending).  For a discussion of OTS actions following the 1996 
Regulations, see infra Part II.B. 
 11. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-210, at 1 (stating that HOLA was passed, among other 
reasons, “to refinance home mortgages [and] to extend relief to the owners of homes”). 
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on the fact that the Act does not apply retroactively to completely 
disregard the reforms.12 
In theory, the authority vested in the CFPB should create a system 
of dual regulation, thereby returning power to the states while creating a 
parallel system of federal measures.13  However, it remains to be seen 
whether the CFPB can operate to prevent the harm to homeowners 
caused by federal thrifts.14  The CFPB’s creation was subject to 
extensive debate and its current operation is controversial.15  If Dodd-
Frank’s changes are not implemented and the CFPB is abolished or its 
activities limited in the name of partisan politics, homeowners and state 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Dodd-Frank is not intended to be retroactive.  Regulations and statutes cannot 
be applied retroactively absent express direction from Congress. See Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“[C]ongressional enactments and 
administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their 
language requires this result.”).  Dodd-Frank provides that the governing section of the 
statute was enacted and amended to become effective on the transfer date, July 21, 
2011, which means that it does not apply to loans originating before that date. See 
Dodd-Frank Act § 1048. 
 13. In the spirit of creating a federal regulatory floor, in addition to implementing 
conflict preemption for regulations adopted by the OCC, the Dodd-Frank Act 
§1041(a)(1) also states that the Act itself does not preempt state law except to the extent 
that the state law is inconsistent with the Act, and, even then, only to the extent of the 
inconsistency.  Section 1041(a)(2) declares that if a state law provides greater 
protection it is not inconsistent. 
 14. The CFPB has included mortgage related items on its short-term to do list and 
has taken some action.  In the preamble to the Mortgage Servicing Final Rules, issued 
on January 17, 2013, the Bureau makes it clear that Regulation X does not preempt the 
field of possible mortgage servicing regulation by states. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024 (2012).  
On April 19, 2013, the Bureau released a proposal addressing questions related to 
mortgages.  The proposal includes an additional clarification that Regulation X does not 
preempt the field and recommends a comment emphasizing the point.  See 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201304_cfpb_proposed-rule_amending-atr-qm-and-
servicing-mortgage-rules.pdf at 3. 
 15. For example, to avoid a prolonged approval process and political debate in the 
Senate, President Obama appointed Richard Cordray as director during recess in 
January of 2012.  2012 Presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s economic advisors 
suggested that “defanging” the Bureau would be a central item in Romney’s economic 
strategy. See Suzy Khimm, The GOP’s New Push to Defang the CFPB, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 8, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/the-gops-new-
push-to-defang-the-cfpb/2012/02/08/gIQA1DrfzQ_blog.html; Janna Herron, CFPD’s 
Existence at Stake in Election, BANKRATE.COM, Oct. 12, 2012, 
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/politics/cfpb-existence-at-stake-election.aspx. 
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economies will suffer while banks benefit from the same relaxed and 
confusing regulatory environment that contributed to the crisis. 
This article addresses a number of issues including: the need for 
federal savings and loans in the context of the original purpose of 
federal thrifts; the nature of our system of government; the regulatory 
failures of the last decade; and Dodd-Frank’s controversial attempts to 
provide a federal solution.  Instead of proposing additional alternative 
reforms, this article reaches the novel conclusion that the federal thrift 
charter is no longer necessary to provide a source of residential lending 
or to stabilize the market.  Further, it states that under the current 
regulatory scheme, the charter is of little value to the banks, states, or 
borrowers. 
Part I of this article analyzes the role of federal thrifts in the recent 
economic crisis.  Part II examines the history of HOLA and the impact 
of the 1996 OTS regulations.  Part III outlines Dodd-Frank’s changes to 
HOLA, preemption, and the financial regulatory structure.  Part IV 
discusses the benefits of eliminating the federal thrift charter.  In sum, if 
federal thrifts add nothing to the market, do not fulfill the original 
intentions of Congress, and serve only to complicate the regulatory 
landscape, there is little reason to maintain their charters. 
I. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL THRIFT IN THE COLLAPSE OF THE 
HOUSING MARKET 
In the fall of 2011 my client, a real estate investor, found himself 
litigating a title dispute in federal court with a federal savings and loan 
association.  He had purchased property at a homeowners’ association 
foreclosure sale but had not been aware of the lender’s pending 
foreclosure due to issues with the title record.  As an investor, he had 
experience handling title cases pro se in state court and typically could 
resolve the issues within a few months.  However, this property was 
different.  The loan originated with and was serviced by a federal thrift, 
so the lender was able to remove the case to federal court based on 
federal question jurisdiction arising out of field preemption under 
HOLA.  Eventually, the case was remanded to state court on the grounds 
that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.16  The suit was 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), a plaintiff must make a motion to remand a 
case on the basis of a defect in the removal procedure within thirty days after the filing 
of the notice of removal under § 1446(a).  However, if at any time the court finds a lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006).  
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not preempted by HOLA since the underlying mortgage was not at 
issue; therefore, the case lacked a federal question.  Following remand, 
my client was able to rely on state consumer protection and property 
laws.  A typical homeowner—lacking the requisite legal knowledge—
would not have been so fortunate.  
HOLA has been used to preempt state laws at every stage of the 
lending process, from the rules governing the initiation of the loan, to 
the terms of the note, to disputes between lenders and homeowners.  
This preemption has contributed to losses felt not only by the 
homeowners but also their neighbors, cities, and states.  When a home 
enters foreclosure, all parties suffer.  Lenders lose between 20 and 60 
cents on the dollar for each foreclosure.17  Vacant foreclosed homes are 
vulnerable to crime, create direct costs and losses to state and local 
government agencies, and reduce property values and home equity in 
the surrounding areas.18  Unfortunately, federal institutions contributed 
to these losses instead of preventing them. 
The last two decades of deregulation, including a 1996 OTS 
regulation declaring field preemption, has resulted in catastrophic 
change to the residential lending landscape.19  In A Failure of 
Capitalism, Judge Posner explains the cause of the financial crisis of 
2008: 
[A]ggressive and imaginative marketing of home mortgages . . . 
[and] diminishing regulation of the banking industry . . . spurred 
speculative lending, especially on residential real estate, which is 
bought mainly with debt.  As in 1929, the eventual bursting of the 
bubble endangered the solvency of banks and other financial 
institutions.20 
Federal favoritism did not prevent the crisis, nor did it minimize the 
involvement of federal thrifts in the collapse.  Decades of deregulation 
                                                                                                                 
A remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction may occur at any time and can be 
made by any party, including the judge acting sua sponte. Id. § 1447. 
 17. NEIGHBORWORKS AMERICA, FORECLOSURE STATISTICS 2, available at http:// 
www.fdic.gov/about/comein/files/foreclosure_statistics.pdf. 
 18. G. THOMAS KINGSLEY, ROBIN SMITH & DAVID PRICE, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, 
THE IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURES ON FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES15–21(2009), 
available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411909. 
 19. For a discussion of the changes to the lending market, see infra Part II. 
 20. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE 
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 13 (2009). 
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aimed at keeping federal thrifts solvent allowed the institutions to 
engage in higher risk practices without adequate oversight from the 
OTS.21 
Federally-chartered financial institutions played a significant role in 
the recent fiscal crisis.  National banks funded 21 of the 25 largest 
subprime lenders.22  In addition, federally-regulated banks and thrifts 
saw higher default rates in their mortgages than state regulated banks 
and thrifts.23  Federal institutions were involved in predatory lending 
through loan origination as well as the purchase of predatory loans or 
securities backed by predatory loans.24  Lenders regulated by the OTS 
were “among the worst offenders.”25  To prevent a complete financial 
meltdown, the federal government was required to bail out institutions 
such as Washington Mutual, the largest institution at the time holding a 
thrift charter.26 
Preemption of state consumer protection laws has weakened 
protection of homeowners at the state level.27  Field preemption allowed 
federal savings and loans to avoid state regulation; at the same time it 
thwarted states’ attempts at lessening the impact of predatory lending 
and other actions by thrifts that led to the mortgage crisis.28  State 
government authorities have testified that one of the biggest obstacles to 
effective regulations of unfair and subprime lending came from the 
federal government.29  Prentiss Cox, who formerly held the positions of 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See infra notes 22–30.  
 22. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 13 (citing testimony of Illinois 
Attorney General Lisa Madigan). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Julian Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: 
Predatory Lending, Preemption and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1303, 1349 (2006). 
 25. Eggert, supra note 3, at 173. 
 26. See All Things Considered: Washington Mutual Collapses (NPR radio 
broadcast Sept. 26, 2008).  On September 25, 2008, the OTS seized Washington Mutual 
Bank and placed it into receivership of the FDIC.  Washington Mutual was sold to JP 
Morgan Chase.  Washington Mutual accounted for approximately 20% of the assets 
overseen by the OTS and 12% of the OTS budget. See OTS Fact Sheet on Washington 
Mutual Bank (Sept. 25, 2008), http://files.ots.treas.gov/730021.pdf. 
 27. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 79–80 (2008). 
 28. Eggert, supra note 3, at 173; Robert Berner & Brian Grow, They Warned Us: 
The Watchdogs Who Saw the Subprime Disaster Coming-And How They Were 
Thwarted by the Banks and Washington, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 20, 2008, at 36, 41. 
 29. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 13. 
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Minnesota Assistant Attorney General and Manager of the Consumer 
Enforcement Division, criticized the federal government stating: “Not 
only were they negligent, they were aggressive players attempting to 
stop any enforcement action[s] . . . . Those guys should have been on 
our side.”30  When considering the original purpose of HOLA, the 
impact of such action is especially troubling. 
Under the U.S. system of government, state laws may go into effect 
when passed, without approval by the federal government.  Although 
“the laws of the United States [are] the Supreme Law of the Land,” state 
law yields to federal law only when it conflicts with the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the U.S.31  The federal government does not have 
general oversight of the states and cannot overturn a law for policy 
reasons.  A determination of any relevant conflict is made by the 
judiciary, which also has the power to review the constitutionality of 
federal and state legislative action.32  Courts utilize the preemption 
doctrine to determine when the Supremacy Clause requires federal law 
to displace state law.  Generally, there is a presumption against 
preemption, but courts abandon the presumption when the area of law 
has “a history of significant federal presence.”33  Courts consider both 
the historic role of state laws and the role of the states when determining 
congressional intent to preempt.34 
The national banking system has been controversial since its 
inception.35  Federal financial institutions have existed since very early 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. (quoting Prentiss Cox). 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause). 
 32. See U.S. CONST. art. III; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 33. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000). 
 34. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[T]he purpose of Congress 
is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption case.”). 
 35. The debate is first addressed by the Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  In 1816, Congress passed a statute creating a national 
bank to perform usual banking functions and serve as a depository for federal 
government funds.  Supporters of the bank argued that it was necessary to help facilitate 
economic expansion and provide a source of funds for the government during wartime.  
Id. at 330.  Opponents, such as Thomas Jefferson, argued that the states maintained the 
power to control banking under the Tenth Amendment and that the Commerce Clause 
did not provide Congress with the power to create a national bank. 5 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 284–89 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904).  In upholding the actions of 
Congress, the Court asserted the superiority of federal law above states’ rights, 
declaring: “[T]he states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, 
burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by 
2013] HOLA PREEMPTION 573 
in American history, but states have always had a hand in the regulation 
of the day-to-day activities of banks.36  In fact, the rules governing 
national banks chartered pursuant to the National Bank Act (“NBA”) 
only preempt state law when state regulation prevents an institution 
from engaging in an activity authorized by this act.37  For example, 
national banks are subjected to state contract, property, licensing, 
corporations, and insurance laws.38 
Federal thrifts have been given the benefit of field preemption since 
inception; however, this policy is an anomaly in banking regulation.  
Field preemption is usually not detrimental to plaintiffs, but this has not 
been the case with federal thrifts.  Because of the way the OTS was 
funded, the banks, and not the citizens, were the customers of the federal 
regulators.  The OTS was funded largely through assessments from the 
institutions it regulated, so the more thrift charters, the greater the 
revenue.39  The OTS was incentivized to lure banks into the system.  
Thus, there was little regulation following the clear and more expansive 
declaration of field preemption.  States’ continued attempts to protect 
consumers with reforms were thwarted by OTS efforts to preempt state 
                                                                                                                 
Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government.” 
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 336.  See also Daniel A. Farber, The Story of McCulloch: 
Banking on National Power, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 33, 35 (Michael C. Dorf 
ed., 2004). 
 36. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 534 (2009) (“States . . . 
have always enforced their general laws against national banks—–and have enforced 
their banking-related laws against national banks for at least 85 years . . . .”). 
 37. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (In Rice, the 
state of Illinois sued several grain warehousemen for violating the Illinois Grain 
Warehouse Act.  The warehousemen sued in federal court, arguing that state law was 
preempted by the U.S. Warehouse Act and that the federal law should be construed to 
mean that Illinois may not regulate subjects in any related area, even though the scope 
of federal regulation is not as broad as the regulatory scheme of the state. The court 
held that when Congress legislates in a field which the States have traditionally 
occupied, the Court begins its analysis with the assumption that the police powers of the 
states were not superseded by the federal law unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); see 
also infra Part III.C. 
 38. See 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (2012) (stating that state laws regarding contracts, torts, 
criminal law, debt collection, etc. apply to federally-charted banks “to the extent [such 
laws are] consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank of Marion 
County, N.A. v. Nelson, Florida Insurance Commissioner, et al., 517 U.S. 25 (1996)”). 
 39. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 54. 
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laws and shield the banks from regulation.40  As a result, institutions 
engaged in charter shopping, often opting for the least rigorous 
regulations within the federal regime. 
Even in the face of preemption, OTS and OCC actions contradict 
the general principles that the federal government cannot overrule a state 
law solely due to policy reasons and may only challenge laws through 
judicial review.41  Despite having a less restrictive preemption standard, 
the OCC was not an innocent actor in the financial crisis.42  The OCC 
comptrollers used their authority to admonish and threaten the states as 
well as block state efforts to regulate federal entities, encouraging them 
to focus on state-chartered institutions and non-banking institutions 
instead.43  Both the OCC and OTS issued regulations that infringed on 
state rights, arguing policy under the guise of preemption.44  In fact, the 
predatory lending laws advanced by the states did not conflict with 
federal laws, as there were no comparable federal laws in existence.45  
Unfortunately, homeowners with loans involving a federal thrift 
executed before July 21, 2011 are subject to field preemption and the 
OTS regulations put in place before Dodd-Frank.46  These homeowners 
are still left without a remedy due to federal interference in the markets. 
Dodd-Frank seeks to return to the states some of their previous 
power to regulate financial institutions.  This effort does not address the 
problems that federal thrifts have caused to the market as a whole, nor 
does it address the efficacy of the institutions.  While analyzing the 
financial crisis in his book, Judge Posner states, “[t]he costs of the 
present depression may include a swing to excessive regulation [and] a 
politically as well as economically unhealthy dependence of business on 
government largesse . . . .”47  The federal thrift is an example of this 
phenomenon.  The 1980s saw a period of deregulation and relaxed 
restrictions on savings and loans for the purpose of increasing the 
stability and profits of federal thrifts; this era resulted in the collapse of 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See McCoy et al., supra note 10, at 1353; see also CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, 
supra note 3, at 13. 
 41. See supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship 
between state and federal government). 
 42. See CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 13. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Dodd-Frank Act § 1044(a); see infra Part III.C. 
 47. POSNER, supra note 20, at 114–15. 
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several institutions.48  The OTS was created, HOLA was amended, and 
the oversight of thrifts changed in order to promote stability.49  Dodd-
Frank is the second major attempt to reform federal thrifts, aiming to 
keep them afloat while minimizing the impact of failure.  Despite facing 
yet another crisis involving federal savings and loans,50 Congress did not 
address in the first instance whether federal thrifts are necessary to 
stimulate residential lending during their discussions on the Dodd-Frank 
Act. 
Thus, despite the failures of federal regulations and the collapse of 
federal thrifts, the threat of complex and protracted litigation is still a 
federal savings and loan’s greatest weapon against economically 
distressed homeowners.  Although the Dodd-Frank Act changes 
preemption for thrifts to the standard governing banks pursuant to the 
NBA, plaintiffs will still face the prospect of litigation in federal court 
while these courts interpret the new standards.51  In addition, if the OCC 
continues its regulatory behavior, eliminating the OTS will not give 
states the power they need to protect homeowners and properly regulate 
federal thrifts. 
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION UNDER HOLA 
Federal legislation preempts state law in three circumstances: (1) 
where Congress expresses a clear intent to preempt state law; (2) when 
federal law occupies the field; or (3) where a clear conflict exists 
between federal law and state law.52  A federal defense such as 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See infra Part II.A. (discussing the savings and loan crisis). 
 49. Id.; see also Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act 
(FIRREA) § 101, 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2006). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See infra Part III for a detailed discussion of the Dodd-Frank changes to the 
residential lending industry. 
 52. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525–26 (1977); Ray v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157–58 (1978); Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. 
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30–31 (1996); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (quoting 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) (“[T]he purpose of Congress is the 
ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.”).  Under field preemption, a state law is 
preempted “if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.” 
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under 
conflict preemption, a conflict exists when a state regulation makes compliance with the 
federal law a “physical impossibility,” or where the state law creates “an obstacle to the 
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preemption is not enough to grant removal to a federal forum.53  
However, if there is field preemption of an area of law, the claim 
actually arises under federal law for purposes of removal.54  Prior to 
Dodd-Frank, the OTS relied on HOLA to permit the field preemption of 
state laws against federal thrifts, their subsidiaries, and independent 
agents.55  Although the OTS carved out exceptions for property, fraud, 
and contract claims, by preempting laws that substantially impact 
mortgage lending and servicing, it effectively took control of areas 
traditionally controlled by the states without providing a comparable 
form of relief.56 
The sections below outline the history of HOLA preemption and 
federal thrifts, as well as the 1996 OTS regulations.  They also describe 
how the courts have interpreted the OTS field preemption mandate. 
A. HISTORY OF HOLA AND THE FEDERAL THRIFT 
The residential lending market has changed greatly during the last 
century.57  Prior to the development of federal institutions that promoted 
lending, residential mortgages were uncommon.  HOLA, “a product of 
the Great Depression of the 1930’s, was intended ‘to provide emergency 
relief with respect to home mortgage indebtedness at a time when as 
                                                                                                                 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Florida 
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). 
 53. Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 461–63 (1894). 
 54. Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). 
 55. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 6–8 (2007) (holding that a 
national bank’s mortgage business, even when conducted by a subsidiary of that bank 
rather than the bank itself, cannot be subject to state mortgage lending requirements 
such as registration, inspection and enforcement regimes); SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 
F.3d 525, 532 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that when a thrift acts through an independent 
agent, activities of the agent are protected); Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS), P-2003-1, Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act (Jan. 21, 2003), 
http:// www.ots.treas.gov/docs/5/56301.pdf. See also State Farm Bank, FSB v. Reardon, 
539 F.3d 336, 340–41 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 56. See 12 C.F.R. § 560 (2012). 
 57. In 1900, less than half of Americans owned their own home.   Following a 
slight uptick in the 1920s, the Great Depression drove the rate down to 44 percent.  
After the housing reforms of the New Deal Era, the rate rose to 61.9% by 1960, and 
continued to slowly rise to a rate of 66.2% in 2000. See Historical Census of Housing 
Tables, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ 
census/historic/owner.html (last updated Oct. 31, 2011). 
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many as half of all home loans in the country were in default.”58  The 
purpose of HOLA was to create additional sources of mortgage 
financing in areas where no existing home-loan institutions were 
available.59  HOLA was intended to provide emergency relief in 
response to inadequacies in the state systems.60  HOLA did serve its 
purpose for several decades under the careful regulation of federal 
government agencies, and homeownership grew due to an abundance of 
financing sources.61 
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (“FHLBB”) was the primary 
regulator of federal savings associations until 1989, when the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”) 
amended HOLA and the OTS took over the FHLBB’s supervisory 
responsibilities and rulemaking powers.62  Up until the financial 
difficulties of the 1970s, federal thrifts served their purpose and 
operated to increase residential lending.63  The Federal Reserve gave 
savings and loan associations favorable treatment, allowing them to pay 
higher interest rates on deposits than commercial banks.64  Eventually, 
non-bank lenders began to enter the residential lending market. These 
entities offered more advantageous interest rates, alternative loan 
arrangements, and other perks prohibited or restricted by federal 
regulations.65  Due to inflation, competition from other institutions, and 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 159 (1982) 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-210, at 1 (1933) (Conf. Rep.)); see also In re Ocwen Loan 
Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 59. See 77 CONG. REC. 2480, 2486 (1933); De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 159–60 
(“[HOLA was passed in 1933] and provided for the creation of a system of federal 
savings and loan associations, which would be regulated by the Board so as to ensure 
their vitality as permanent associations to promote the thrift of the people in a 
cooperative manner, to finance their homes and the homes of their neighbors.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 159–60; see also 77 CONG. REC. 2480, 2486. 
 61. See Historical Census of Housing Tables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 31, 
2011), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html. 
 62. FIRREA § 101, 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2006). 
 63. See Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: 
Truth and Consequences, FDIC BANKING REV., Dec. 2000, at 26, available at  
 http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/. 
 64. See Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. 217 (2010) (Regulation Q no longer exists 
independently and has now been incorporated into Regulation D). 
 65. See generally Curry & Shibut, supra note 63, at 27. 
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the restrictions placed on federal thrifts, savings and loans struggled to 
make profits and compete in the market.66 
In an attempt to strengthen thrifts, the legislature enacted several 
acts.  In 1980, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act67 authorized thrifts to issue credit cards and make consumer 
and commercial real estate loans, each of up to 20% of assets, 
respectively.68  Other legislation reduced net worth requirements, 
expanded the activities of federal thrifts, and enacted tax incentives.  For 
instance, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 198269 
allowed thrifts to offer adjustable rate mortgages, interest only notes, 
and balloon notes.70  For the first time, efforts were made to allow 
federal savings and loans to engage in more than just residential lending 
activities.  Thrifts were allowed to make higher risk non-residential 
loans in the interest of receiving greater reward. 
Unfortunately, these expansions simply shifted the risk from the 
thrifts to the homeowners.71  In addition to a reduction in legislative 
control, oversight by the FHLBB was increasingly lax over the years, 
due in part to a reduction in its staff.72  Favorable regulations caused 
banks to obtain federal charters at higher rates than before.73  These 
efforts did not yield the intended result, and by the mid-1980s the 
federal savings and loan crisis erupted.74  Customers of thrifts demanded 
higher rates of return on deposits and thrifts complied out of fear of 
losing their market share.  Despite this arrangement, the interest that 
thrifts earned from mortgages and other long-term loans did not generate 
adequate revenue to match their costs.75  Federal thrifts began to fail 
nationwide, resulting in record losses estimated at a total of $12.1 billion 
in 1988.76  In total, almost 3,000 banks and federal savings and loans 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. 
 67. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C. & 15 U.S.C.). 
 68. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-51(2). 
 69. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
the U.S.C.). 
 70. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3805 (1982). 
 71. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 35–36. 
 72. Curry & Shibut, supra note 63. 
 73. Id. at 27. 
 74. Id. 
 75. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 34. 
 76. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Savings Loss Put at $2.3 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 
1989 at D1; see also Curry & Shibut supra note 63, at 27–28. 
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failed.77  Between July 1990 and February 1992, before the crisis had 
even ended, national home values had declined by 2.5%.78  The total 
cost of the crisis is estimated to range between $100 and $160 billion.79 
In response to this crisis that began in the late 1980s, Congress 
passed FIRREA in 1989, which restructured savings and loans by 
dissolving the FHLBB and replacing it with the OTS.80  FIRREA then 
amended HOLA to give the OTS the responsibility of promulgating 
uniform accounting and disclosure regulations.81  As part of the bailout 
plan for federal thrifts, FIRREA also shifted deposit insurance functions 
to the FDIC.82  FIRREA also imposed stricter net worth requirements 
and greater general oversight.83 
In addition to the changes in thrift structure, the OTS was also 
empowered to preempt conflicting state law through regulations 
pursuant to HOLA and FIRREA.84  Under HOLA, OTS had “authority 
[that] is preemptive of any state law purporting to address the subject of 
the operations of a Federal savings association.”85  Regulators believed 
that preemption would provide a uniform set of regulations and ensure 
the stability of federal thrifts “by efficiently delivering low-cost credit to 
the public free from undue regulatory duplication and burden.”86 
Notably, HOLA’s content does not contain any explicit 
congressional intent of field preemption, and no court has specifically 
addressed whether OTS field preemption is appropriate.87  However, 
despite Congress’ silence, laws adopted by the FHLBB as well as case 
law interpreting such regulations have held that HOLA does in fact 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See Curry & Shibut supra note 63, at 27–28. 
 78. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 36. 
 79. Curry & Shibut, supra note 63, at 29. 
 80. FIRREA §§ 301, 304, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1462a, 1468 (2006).  
 81. FIRREA § 301, 12 U.S.C. § 1463(b).  FIRREA amendments also require all 
savings associations to achieve and maintain adequate capital, with standards no less 
stringent than those applicable to national banks. HOLA § 5(t)(1)(c). 
 82. Previously, deposits were insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation (FSLIC), which insured savings and loan accounts up to $100,000. 
 83. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(c)(2)(a). 
 84. In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 642 
(7th Cir. 2007). 
 85. 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (2012). 
 86. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2012). 
 87. See JULIE L. WILLIAMS, SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS: MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND 
CONVERSIONS § 17.01, at 17-4. 
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occupy the field.88  Long before OTS regulations declared field 
occupation in 1996, one district court concluded that “not only does the 
Act of Congress which authorizes the creation, operation and 
supervision of federal savings and loan associations . . . embrace the 
entire field, but the comprehensive rules and regulations adopted by the 
Board clearly meet the test of covering the subject matter of the 
statute.”89  Over the years, Congress did not correct this assumption, 
even following the near collapse of the institutions in the 1980s.  In 
Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association v. De La Cuesta,90 the 
Supreme Court states, “it would have been difficult for Congress to give 
. . . a broader mandate . . . .  [HOLA governs] the powers and operations 
of every federal savings and loan association from its cradle to its 
corporate grave.”91  Until Dodd-Frank eliminated the OTS, it had 
plenary authority under HOLA to issue regulations governing federal 
savings and loans.92  As a result, federal thrifts were given a level of 
preemption greater than that afforded to national banks. 
In connection to loans originating before Dodd-Frank,93 OTS 
regulation claims that it “occupies the entire field of lending regulation 
for federal savings associations.”94  The OTS regulations preempted 
state laws “affecting the operations of federal savings associations . . . to 
enable federal savings associations to conduct their operations in 
accordance with the best practices of thrift institutions.”95  Specifically, 
the regulations preempt state laws imposing requirements regarding 
licensing, credit terms, loan fees, disclosure requirements, origination, 
and interest rates; on the other hand they do not preempt state laws that 
“only incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal savings 
associations.”96  In theory, the federal system of borrower-protection 
                                                                                                                 
 88. People v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 
1951). 
 89. Id. at 318. 
 90. 458 U.S. 141 (1982). 
 91. Id. at 145 (quoting Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. at 316). 
 92. See FRREA, Pub. L. No. § 301, 103 Stat. 280-282 (repealed 2010); Sec. Sav. & 
Loan v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 960 F.2d 1318, 1321 n.8 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 93. Dodd-Frank overturns the field preemption standard in the OTS regulation, and 
declares that courts must make a case-by-case determination as to whether a state’s 
substantive law should be preempted. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1044(a). 
 94. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2012). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. § 560.2(b)–(c). 
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statues would be used to protect homeowners.97  The OTS believed 
preemption was necessary to prevent another savings and loan crisis.  
Ultimately, field preemption resulted in an improper federal intrusion on 
states’ rights and contributed to the financial collapse.98 
B. THE 1996 OTS REGULATIONS 
With the authority granted by FIRREA, the OTS promulgated a 
regulation in 1996 asserting the rights of federal savings and loan 
associations to “extend credit as authorized under federal law . . . 
without regard to state laws purporting to regulate or otherwise affect 
their credit activities.”99  Specifically, 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) provides: 
Occupation of field.  Pursuant to sections 4(a) and 5(a) of the 
HOLA, 12 U.S.C. 1463(a), 1464(a), OTS is authorized to 
promulgate regulations that preempt state laws affecting the 
operations of federal savings associations when deemed appropriate 
to facilitate the safe and sound operation of federal savings 
associations, to enable federal savings associations to conduct their 
operations in accordance with the best practices of thrift institutions 
in the United States, or to further other purposes of the HOLA.  To 
enhance safety and soundness and to enable federal savings 
associations to conduct their operations in accordance with best 
practices (by efficiently delivering low-cost credit to the public free 
from undue regulatory duplication and burden), OTS hereby 
occupies the entire field of lending regulation for federal savings 
associations.  OTS intends to give federal savings association’s 
maximum flexibility to exercise their lending powers in accordance 
with a uniform federal scheme of regulation.  Accordingly, federal 
savings associations may extend credit as authorized under federal 
law, including this part, without regard to state laws purporting to 
regulate or otherwise affect their credit activities, except to the 
extent provided in paragraph (c) of this section or § 560.110 of this 
part . . . .100 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Interview by Dixie Noonan, Senior Counsel, FCIC, of Alan Greenspan, former 
Chairman, Federal Reserve, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 31, 2010), available at 
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2010-03-31%20FCIC% 
20memo%20of%20staff%20interview%20with%20Alan%20Greenspan%20Interview,
%20Federal%20Reserve%20Board.pdf. 
 98. See supra Part I for an analysis of federal thrift involvement in the financial 
crisis. 
 99. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a). 
 100. Id. 
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Subsection 560.2(a) leaves no room for conflicting state laws.101  
The regulation codifies the long-standing presumption that HOLA 
occupies the field.102 
Subsection 560.2(b) goes on to provide a non-exhaustive list of 
examples of state laws that are expressly preempted, stating, in relevant 
part: 
Except as provided in § 560.110 of this part, the types of state laws 
preempted by paragraph (a) of this section include, without 
limitation, state laws purporting to impose requirements regarding 
processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment 
or participation in, mortgages.103 
The list of activities in 560.2(b) is similar to lists found in the 
regulations of other institutions.104  However, the language in 560.2(b) is 
stronger.  Other regulations preempt state laws that “obstruct” or 
“impair” the activities of federal institutions, while 560.2(b) preempts 
actions that impose any requirement without regard to whether a state 
regulation conflicts with or compliments federal law. 
The savings clause found in 560.2(c) has been the source of most of 
the litigation related to HOLA.  It should be used to allow states to 
maintain control of traditional areas of law.  However, due to its 
wording, this provision has been utilized to deny homeowners legal 
remedies.  Subsection 560.2(c) provides: 
State laws of the following types are not preempted to the extent that 
they only incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal 
savings associations or are otherwise consistent with the purposes of 
paragraph (a) of this section: 
(1) Contract and commercial law; 
(2) Real property law; 
(3) Homestead laws specified in 12 U.S.C. 1462a(f); 
(4) Tort law; 
(5) Criminal law; and 
(6) Any other law that OTS, upon review, finds: 
(i) Furthers a vital state interest; and 
(ii) Either   has   only   an   incidental   effect   on   
lending operations or is not otherwise contrary to 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Id. 
 102. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 161–62 (1982).  
 103. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b)(10). 
 104. See, e.g., id. § 34.4. 
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the purposes expressed in paragraph (a) of this 
section.105 
 
Following the guidance of the OTS, the Ninth Circuit provided a 
procedure for determining whether regulations preempt a state law in 
Silvas v. E*TRADE Mortgage Corp.106: 
The first step will be to determine whether the type of law in 
question is listed in paragraph (b).  If so, the analysis will end there; 
the law is preempted.  If the law is not covered by paragraph (b), the 
next question is whether the law affects lending.  If it does, then, in 
accordance with paragraph (a), the presumption arises that the law is 
preempted.  This presumption can be reversed only if the law can 
clearly be shown to fit within the confines of paragraph (c).  For 
these purpose paragraph (c) is intended to be interpreted narrowly.  
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of preemption.107 
The OTS failed to provide a bright line test for deciding preemption 
issues.  In a 1996 OTS Opinion Letter, the Chief Counsel of the OTS 
concluded that an Indiana statute prohibiting deceptive trade practices in 
commerce was exempt pursuant to paragraph (c).108  The law did not 
“affect lending” because its purpose was to regulate practices of all 
businesses within the state, not to impose policy on federal thrifts 
specifically.109  The position of the OTS evolved over time, and in so 
doing found that more state laws had been preempted.  In 2003, the OTS 
issued letters announcing preemption of predatory lending statutes in 
several states including Georgia, New York, New Jersey, and New 
Mexico.110  Although the predatory lending statutes sought to prohibit 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Id. § 560.2(c). 
 106. 514 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 107. Id. at 1005 (quoting Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951, 50,966–67 
(Sept. 30, 1996) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 560.2)). 
 108. Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-96-14, Preemption 
of State Laws Applicable to Credit Card Transactions, 6 (Dec. 24, 1996), 
http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/ots/legal-opinions/ots-lo-12-24-1996.pdf.  
 109. Id. (“[B]ecause federal thrifts are presumed to interact with their borrowers in a 
truthful manner, Indiana’s general prohibition on deception should have no measurable 
impact on their lending operations.”). 
 110. See Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-1, 
Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act (Jan. 21, 2003), www.occ.gov/static/news-
issuances/ots/legal-opinions/ots-lo-01-21-2003.pdf.; Chief Counsel of the Office of 
Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-2, Preemption of New York Predatory Lending Law 
(Jan. 30, 2003), www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/ots/legal-opinions/ots-lo-01-30-
2003.pdf; Chief Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-5, 
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egregious behavior that was traditionally within state domain, the OTS 
held that the statutes imposed requirements on lending as outlined in 
paragraph (b).111 
OTS regulations preempted areas traditionally under state control 
such as real property, fraud, and contract law112 if they imposed 
requirements on lenders or substantially impacted mortgage lending and 
servicing.  In the Letters Preempting Predatory Lending Laws, the OTS 
used preemption to obstruct state attempts to slow the impact of the 
crisis.113  Once the OTS occupied the field, the agency became the only 
source of protection from abusive practices by federal lenders.  By 
carving out exceptions for specific types of law but preempting all 
activity that interfered with lending, the OTS regulation resulted in 
confusion and allowed banks to rely on an exception to escape 
regulation.114 
C. ANALYSIS OF HOLA PREEMPTION IN THE COURTS 
Federal circuits have used varying methods to interpret the 1996 
HOLA Regulations, with the Seventh Circuit finding preemption only in 
limited circumstances and the Eighth and Ninth Circuits taking a 
broader approach.115  Seventh Circuit courts have held that state 
common-law claims are not preempted, and that preemption is not 
                                                                                                                 
Preemption of New Jersey Predatory Lending Act (July 22, 2003), 
www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/ots/legal-opinions/ots-lo-07-22-2003.pdf; Chief 
Counsel of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), P-2003-6, Preemption of New 
Mexico Home Loan Protection Act (Sept. 2, 2003), www.occ.gov/static/news-
issuances/ots/legal-opinions/ots-lo-09-02-2003.pdf [hereinafter collectively “OTS 
Letters Preempting Predatory Lending Laws”]. 
 111. See OTS Letters Preempting Predatory Lending Laws, supra note 110. 
 112. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (finding that 
federal patent law does not prevent enforcement of a contract for payment of royalty 
fees when the parties contemplate denial of the patent in the contract); Oregon ex rel. 
State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977) (finding that a 
majority of law related to property exists in the domain of the states). 
 113. OTS Letters Preempting Predatory Lending Laws, supra note 110. 
 114. See, e.g., CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 3, at 14–16. 
 115. See, e.g., Casey v. FDIC, 583 F.3d 586 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding claims under 
Missouri Merchandising Practices Act preempted by HOLA); Silvas v. E*Trade Mortg. 
Corp., 514 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding claims under California Unfair 
Competition Law preempted by HOLA); In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. 
Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding common law claims generally 
not preempted). 
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required when it leaves a homeowner with no adequate remedy.116  The 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits have followed the OTS regulations exactly, 
using an “as applied” analysis to preempt all activity that interferes with 
lending in any way without consideration of the outcome.117  Other 
Circuits have either chosen to clearly follow the Seventh, Eighth or 
Ninth Circuits or approach preemption on a case-by-case basis, creating 
inconsistent results.118 
Following Judge Posner’s approach from In re Ocwen Loan 
Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litigation, courts such as the 
Seventh Circuit have held that certain state law claims against a federal 
savings and loan association compliment rather than conflict with 
HOLA.119  The courts have balanced the OTS’s authority over federal 
banks with the ability of homeowners to recover under HOLA’s 
statutory structure.120  When a plaintiff’s claim is based on a defendant’s 
conduct under laws that do not regulate lending activity, the claims are 
not preempted.121  Under Judge Posner’s approach the court does not 
find preemption even if a law may be applied to impact lending in some 
scenarios, as long as it does not impose requirements on a federal thrift 
in the case at hand.122  Claims based on property law have long been 
recognized by the Supreme Court as a matter of special concern to 
states; the Seventh Circuit thus considers them to be specifically 
reserved for the states by §560.2(c).123  Therefore, to determine whether 
a property claim is preempted, the Seventh Circuit considers the 
function and specific nature of each state law claim to determine 
whether it is an attempt at regulation preempted by HOLA.124 
                                                                                                                 
 116. See, e.g., Ocwen, 491 F.3d 638. 
 117. See Casey, 583 F.3d 586; Silvas, 514 F.3d 1001. 
 118. See supra notes 135–177 and accompanying text. 
 119. Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 643–44; see also Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 
F.3d 547, 578 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 120. Ocwen, 491 F.3d 638 at 644; see also Jones v. Home Loan Inv., F.S.B., 718 F. 
Supp. 2d 728, 735 (S.D. W. Va. 2010). 
 121. See Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 643–44. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Butner v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55–56 (1979) (“Property interests are created and defined 
by state law.”). 
 124. See Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 643; see also Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. 
Supp. 2d 336, 356 (D. Mass. 2011) (“The question is one of function, not theory: will 
enforcement of the cause of action interfere with or contravene lending, the regulation 
of which Congress has committed exclusively to a federal agency?”). 
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The Seventh Circuit approach to HOLA preemption is reflective of 
judicial attempts to provide a remedy for homeowners.  In Ocwen, the 
lender sought to dismiss the homeowner’s claims based on fraud and 
breach of contract.  In deciding to deny the lender’s motion to dismiss, 
Judge Posner explains “[t]he line between subsections (b) and (c) is both 
intuitive and reasonably clear.”125  The OTS “has exclusive authority to 
regulate the savings and loan industry in the sense of fixing fees 
(including penalties), setting licensing requirements, prescribing certain 
terms in mortgages, establishing requirements for disclosure of credit 
information to customers, and setting standards for processing and 
servicing of mortgages.”126  However, the “assertion of plenary authority 
does not deprive persons harmed by the wrongful acts of savings and 
loan associations of their basic state common-law type remedies.”127  
The court balanced the OTS’s authority over federal banks with the 
ability of consumers to recover in federal courts under federal or state 
law.128 
The Seventh Circuit provides examples of scenarios in which an as 
applied analysis would yield an unjust result: 
Suppose [a savings and loan association] signs a mortgage 
agreement with a homeowner that specifies an annual interest rate of 
6 percent and a year later bills the homeowner at a rate of 10 percent 
and when the homeowner refuses to pay institutes foreclosure 
proceedings.  It would be surprising for a federal regulation to forbid 
the homeowner’s state to give the homeowner a defense based on the 
mortgagee’s breach of contract.  Or if the mortgagee fraudulently 
represents to the mortgagor that it will forgive a default, and then 
forecloses, it would be surprising for a federal regulation to bar a suit 
for fraud.  Some federal laws do create such bars, notably ERISA, 
but this is recognized as exceptional.  Enforcement of state law in 
either of the mortgage-servicing examples above would complement 
rather than substitute for the federal regulatory scheme.129 
Instead of a blanket preemption of all laws, the Seventh Circuit 
divides claims into those that fall onto the regulatory side of the ledger, 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 643. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.; see also Jones v. Home Loan Inv., F.S.B., 718 F. Supp. 2d 728, 734 (S.D. 
W. Va. 2010). 
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2013] HOLA PREEMPTION 587 
and those that fall onto the common law side.130  State consumer finance 
laws, like the ones preempted by the OTS in the Letters Preempting 
Predatory Lending Laws, were aimed at curbing the activities 
established in the examples above.131 
Following the Seventh Circuit’s approach, a court would not 
preempt a wrongful foreclosure or consumer protection law aimed at 
subprime lending if such law merely applies a common law equally to 
all lenders, even if it addresses loan servicing and processing.  To 
determine preemption the court must look to the nature of the claim, 
including the actions alleged in the complaint.  The OTS lacks the 
authority to provide a remedy to those injured by the wrongful acts of 
federal savings and loan associations.132  Therefore, if HOLA preempts 
all causes of action related to the mortgage, even those for which it has 
not provided remedies, then federal savings associations could “use 
preemption as a shield to avoid adherence” to the commitments that they 
make to their customers.133  Since neither federal law nor the OTS has 
the means to redress plaintiffs harmed by federal savings and loan 
associations’ breaches of contract, fraud, or tortious acts, Ocwen holds 
that the regulations cannot be read to deprive persons of basic common 
law remedies, even those that may interfere with loan servicing. 134  The 
Seventh Circuit and courts following its approach apply an analysis 
similar to that used in cases under the NBA.135 
Courts following the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held that any 
“state law that either on its face or as applied imposes requirements 
regarding the examples listed in § 560.2(b) is preempted.”136  The Ninth 
Circuit explains in Silvas that the OTS has laid out a system of 
regulation “so pervasive as to leave no room for state regulatory 
control.”137  Courts following this approach use an applied analysis 
where a state law that is not preempted on its face may be preempted if 
it fits within Section 560.2(b) as applied.  Claims based on a loan 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. at 644. 
 131. See OTS Letters Preempting Predatory Lending Laws, supra note 110. 
 132. See id. at 643. 
 133. Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 336, 356 (D. Mass. 2011) 
(citations omitted). 
 134. Ocwen, 491 F.3d at 643. 
 135. See infra Part III.B. 
 136. Casey v. FDIC, 583 F.3d 586, 595 (8th Cir. 2009). See also Silvas v. E*Trade 
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transaction, even when rooted in common law claims, are preempted.138 
This analysis preempts most state consumer protection laws, unless they 
are pure common law claims.139 
In Silvas, the Ninth Circuit held that claims based on the California 
unfair competition law were preempted by HOLA.140  The plaintiffs 
alleged that E*Trade Mortgage Corporation violated the law by 
including false information on its website and in advertising, by 
misrepresenting consumer legal rights in advertising and other 
documents, and by charging an interest rate lock-in fee that was not 
refunded when loan applicants cancelled.141  The California law applied 
equally to all businesses and was not limited to just federal 
institutions.142  It did not create a regime of favoritism for state 
entities.143 
The Ninth Circuit took a very limited approach in analyzing 
Section 560.2(b).  The Ninth Circuit held that the claims were 
preempted by HOLA, as HOLA generally preempts state law claims 
regarding advertising and disclosures.144  Additionally, HOLA preempts 
state laws that purport to impose requirements on loan fees.  The Court 
ended its analysis because the law was the type of state law 
contemplated under paragraph (b) and did not require examination under 
paragraph (c). 
In Casey, the Eighth Circuit reached a similar result, finding that 
claims that violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act were 
preempted by HOLA because the law purported to impose requirements 
regarding loan-related fees.145  The plaintiff alleged that the lender’s 
practice of charging fees for the preparation of documents by non-
lawyers violated the Missouri law.146  The homeowners in Casey argued 
that paragraph (b) referred to state laws that on their face impose 
requirements on lenders, and because the Missouri Act was a law of 
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general application the statute was not preempted by HOLA.147  The 
court disagreed, holding that because the OTS had previously used an as 
applied analysis, a state law that either on its face or as applied imposes 
requirements regarding the examples listed in paragraph (b) is 
preempted.148  Even though the law was of general application, as it 
applied to the homeowner’s claims the statute imposed requirements 
regarding loan related fees.149  Under the Casey reading of the law, only 
the OTS had the authority to impose restrictions on fees. 
Courts using the as applied analysis have preempted many types of 
general application laws.  For example, any claims based on defects in 
the procedure used to foreclose the property are preempted by HOLA.150  
Courts taking this approach hold that while a wrongful foreclosure claim 
is also a common law claim, these claims seek to bind federal thrifts to 
requirements outlined in state law and therefore fall within the confines 
of 560.2(b).151  This analysis is unique to federal thrifts; courts analyzing 
preemption under the NBA have held that it does not preempt wrongful 
foreclosure laws.152 
Under the as applied analysis, HOLA has also been found to 
preempt claims related to breach of an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing in lending, even though they are nothing more than 
breach of contract claims.153  Additionally, when claims are based on the 
deficiency of disclosures in loan documents or the structure of the loan 
itself, claims are preempted by HOLA even though they may be 
classified as fraud, breach of contract, or other common law causes of 
action.154  Thus, courts utilizing the as applied analysis will find these 
claims to be preempted even if there is no comparable federal means of 
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recovery, simply because they impact lending.  The as applied approach 
gives very little deference to the savings provision in 560.2(c). 
Under either the Seventh Circuit of as-applied approach, if claims 
are clearly based on common law, courts do not find preemption.155  As 
one district court explains: “HOLA does not preempt a plaintiff’s claims 
that are premised on fraud or promises made by defendants. ‘[S]uch 
claims are not necessarily preempted, because the only ‘requirement’ 
they impose on federal savings banks is that they be held responsible for 
the statement they make to their borrowers.’”156  When all of a plaintiff’s 
claims are based on representations made by the lender and do not 
involve the administration of the loan, claims are not preempted.157 
Similarly, when a claim is purely based on breach of contract, there 
is no preemption.  If a homeowner seeks only to compel a thrift to 
supply the notice that it contractually agreed to, without requiring the 
lender to draft specific terms, the common law breach of contract claims 
are not preempted by HOLA. 
HOLA field preemption requires various types of cases to be 
litigated in federal court, such as actions arising out of lending or 
regulating lending.  As a result of the OTS regulations, courts allowed 
banks to remove cases to federal court and often found that HOLA 
preempted homeowners’ attempts to recover for egregious practices by 
the banks.  As there were no corresponding federal claims, homeowners 
were left with no remedy for the wrongs of lenders holding federal thrift 
charters.  Many federal courts saw the injustice in such a system and 
used the exceptions in the regulations to allow cases to continue in state 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See, e.g., Susilo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1186 (C.D. 
Cal. 2011) (“[W]hen a plaintiff’s claim is based on a defendant’s failure to fulfill the 
general duty not to misrepresent material facts, . . . the claims are not preempted.” 
(citing Biggins v. Wells Fargo & Co., 266 F.R.D. 399, 417 (N.D. Cal. 2009))). As long 
as special requirements are not imposed on lenders, the claims are not preempted by 
HOLA. Id. 
 156. Viets v. Wachovia Mortg., F.S.B., No. 2:11-cv-00169-GMN-RJJ, 2011 WL 
6181934, at *4 (D. Nev. Dec. 12, 2011) (citing Rumbaua v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
No. 11-1998, 2011 WL 3740828, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2011)). 
 157. Id.; see also Becker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:10-cv-02799, 2011 WL 
1103439, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2011) (“[P]laintiff’s fraud claim does not arise from 
a ‘state law purporting to address the subject of the operations of a federal savings 
association’ and is therefore not preempted . . . .”); see also Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d 336, 356 (D. Mass. 2011) (holding promissory estoppel claim 
alleging that lender promised to enter into a loan modification if the borrowers took 
certain steps was not preempted by HOLA). 
2013] HOLA PREEMPTION 591 
court.  Other courts followed the letter of the OTS regulations, utilizing 
an as applied analysis.  These attempts resulted in inconsistencies, 
sometimes even within the same circuit, making it impossible to predict 
the outcome of a homeowner’s lawsuit against a federal thrift. 
III. DODD-FRANK CHANGES TO THE RESIDENTIAL LENDING 
LANDSCAPE 
Federal preemption has been used as a barrier against state efforts 
to address the financial meltdown.158  HOLA preemption was altered 
when the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted on July 21, 2011.159  Title X of 
the Dodd-Frank Act discusses the scope of federal preemption of 
consumer financial laws, limiting it to conflict preemption for 
institutions formerly regulated by the OTS.160  While Dodd-Frank 
attempts to limit the scope of HOLA preemption and clarify which laws 
apply to federal thrifts, it does not address the fact that HOLA is no 
longer necessary or serving its original purposes.  The discussion below 
outlines the changes to the residential lending landscape made by the 
Dodd-Frank Act; analyzes preemption under the NBA, which should 
apply to HOLA for loans originating after July 2011; and explores the 
treatment of HOLA preemption by the courts in the aftermath of Dodd-
Frank. 
A. THE DODD-FRANK CHANGES TO RESIDENTIAL LENDING 
Before Dodd-Frank, no single federal institution had the legal 
authority or responsibility to monitor the entire financial system and 
take action when there was a threat.161  The Dodd-Frank Act then came 
along and merged the OTS into the OCC.162  Dodd-Frank added Section 
6(a) to HOLA, providing that every preemption determination made by 
a court or agency under HOLA “shall be made in accordance with the 
laws and legal standards applicable to national banks regarding the 
preemption of State law.”163  Section 6(b) provides that HOLA “does not 
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occupy the field in any area of State law.”164  Preemption under HOLA 
is now governed by the conflict preemption standard outlined in Barnett 
Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson.165 
The most restrictive procedures against preemption apply when a 
state consumer financial law is at issue.166  Under Dodd-Frank, 
preemption of a state consumer financial law will be permissible only if: 
(i) application of the state law would have a discriminatory effect on 
national banks or federal thrifts as compared to state banks; (ii) the state 
law is preempted under a judicial standard that requires a state consumer 
financial law to prevent or significantly interfere with the exercise of the 
national bank’s or federal thrift’s powers before it can be preempted, 
with such preemption determination being made by the OCC or by a 
court on a case-by-case basis; or (iii) the state law is preempted by 
another provision of federal law other than Title X of the Dodd-Frank 
Act.167  Thus, under Dodd-Frank, a consumer financial protection law 
will not automatically be preempted as it would under 560.2(b), even if 
it “purport[s] to impose requirements regarding . . . [p]rocessing, 
origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participation 
in mortgages.”168  Under Dodd-Frank, preemption occurs only on a case-
by-case basis, and a decision by federal regulators is applicable only to 
the individual state law and substantially equivalent laws.169  Dodd-
Frank is silent on laws that are not “state consumer financial” laws.  If a 
law is not a state consumer financial law, the OCC presumably has the 
power to preempt it using traditional conflict preemption analysis.170 
In response to the Dodd-Frank Act, the OCC issued an Interim 
Final Rule that supersedes 12 C.F.R. § 560.2.171  The OCC Preemption 
Rules, effective July 21, 2011, rescinded subsidiary preemption, laws 
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impairing banks “incidental powers,”172 and conformed HOLA to NBA 
preemption.173  Although the regulations removed the “occupy the field” 
language found in HOLA regulations, the new regulations maintain the 
laundry list of fiduciary laws found in §560.2(b) of HOLA that are 
preempted.174  On its face, the preservation of the list violates part of the 
Dodd-Frank mandate to conduct a case-by-case analysis.  The new 
regulations explicitly apply Barnett Bank only for the list of laws not 
explicitly preempted in §560.2(c) of the HOLA regulations, which 
includes real property, homestead, tort, and criminal law.175  Thus, as 
written and enforced by the OCC, state consumer finance laws are the 
only laws clearly protected by Dodd-Frank.  Other state laws remain 
open to interpretation by the courts and the OCC, possibly in keeping 
with the prevalent approaches to HOLA. 
In addition to structural reforms to the lending and deposit taking 
institutions, Title X of Dodd-Frank also created the CFPB to consolidate 
federal consumer protection into one place.176  The CFPB is tasked with 
educating consumers, monitoring financial products, and restricting 
deceptive trade practices.177  The new Bureau regulates consumer 
financial products and services in compliance with federal law.178  The 
CFPB is tasked with implementing and enforcing federal consumer 
financial law to ensure that consumers have access to markets for 
consumer financial products and services, and that such markets are 
“fair, transparent, and competitive.”179 
The Bureau is placed within the Federal Reserve System but 
operates independently.180  Under the Act, the CFPB is given broad 
regulatory, supervisory, and enforcement authority over “covered 
persons” and “service providers.”181  These are with respect to both new 
consumer financial protection provisions, as well as an array of existing 
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federal consumer financial protection laws and provisions that are to be 
transferred to the CFPB from existing federal banking agencies.182  
Therefore, the CFPB has control over residential lenders of all varieties, 
including non-bank institutions. 
After a one-year “stand up” period, the Bureau obtained 
enforcement authority and commenced most activities on July 21, 
2011.183  However, the CFPB did not have a Director until January of 
2012.  President Obama used a recess appointment to select Richard 
Cordray, thus avoiding a battle with the Senate.  Going forward, the 
CFPB has vowed to overhaul the home mortgage market over a six-
month period beginning in July 2012.184  As of April 2013, new 
regulations have included rules related to disclosure forms, information 
provided to consumers when obtaining a mortgage, and more 
transparency in mortgage servicing.185  In January 2013, the CFPB 
issued new rules regarding mortgage servicing.186  In the preamble to the 
Mortgage Servicing Final Rules, the Bureau makes it clear that 
Regulation X does not preempt the field of mortgage servicing 
regulations by states.187  On April 19, 2013, CFPB released additional 
proposals addressing questions related to mortgages.  The proposal 
includes yet another clarification that Regulation X does not preempt the 
field and recommends a comment emphasizing the point.188  
To date, the CFPB has been over-extended, slow moving, and the 
subject of partisan political debates.  If banks still have the option of 
raising preemption, even if only as a defense, the issue of laborious and 
costly litigation has not been resolved.  The need for repeated 
clarifications from the Bureau is reflective of hesitance from the courts 
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to apply the Dodd-Frank preemption standard.  Other changes proposed 
by the CFPB thus far may help customers obtaining new mortgages, but 
those with existing mortgages are stuck in limbo.  Additionally, the 
availability of upfront cost estimates will not fix wrongful foreclosure 
and other servicing problems.  While the Bureau’s attempts at keeping 
borrowers informed is helpful, consumer disclosure and paperwork 
requirements will not prevent the OCC from overstepping its authority, 
nor will it combat a banker’s ability to delay a homeowner’s recovery in 
the face of egregious behavior by utilizing the court system. 
Dodd-Frank created a regulatory scheme that is vulnerable to the 
changing political climate.  Even if the measures are left intact, history 
shows us that while these measures may help prevent a crisis exactly 
like the current recession, they may not be adequate to produce lasting 
overall reform within the financial industry.189  “Dodd-Frank . . .  relies 
primarily on the same supervisory tool—capital-based regulation—that 
failed to prevent the banking and thrift crises of the 1980s as well as the 
recent financial crisis.”190  Historically, Congress and federal regulators 
have been unable to resolve consumer protection issues without industry 
involvement, which results in less restrictive regulations.191 
The recent crisis is evidence of how detrimental the relationship 
between federal regulators and industry players can be to 
homeowners.192  Post-Dodd-Frank homeowners are still forced to 
address the preemption question, even if only to protest removal.193  The 
case-by-case requirement found in Dodd-Frank, if ever applied, is not 
enough to shelter homeowners from the influence that financial 
institutions have on federal regulators.  Preemption, even case-by-case 
conflict preemption, can still act as a carrot to bait institutions to use the 
federal charter system, particularly if the courts continue to find federal 
preemption when interpreting HOLA.  Looking forward, homeowners 
seeking to make the best of the situation will continue to face avoidance 
and aggressive court action by banks with federal thrift charters. 
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B. THE NBA PREEMPTION STANDARD 
Historically, national banks have been subject to greater state 
control than federal thrifts.194  Preemption under the NBA, and going 
forward HOLA, follows the Barnett Bank conflict preemption standard.  
NBA preemption has always been narrower than HOLA.195  National 
banks are given “all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to 
carry on the business of banking.”196  The OCC defines the incidental 
powers; in the context of mortgage lending, “state laws of general 
application, which merely require all businesses to refrain from 
fraudulent, unfair, or illegal behavior, do not necessarily impair a bank’s 
ability to exercise its real estate lending powers.”197 
The National Bank Act preemption provision states: 
Except where made applicable by Federal law, state laws that 
obstruct, impair or condition a national bank’s ability to fully 
exercise its Federally authorized real estate lending powers do not 
apply to national banks.  Specifically, a national bank may make real 
estate loans…without regard to state law limitations concerning: (10) 
Processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment 
or participation in mortgages.198 
The language does not declare occupation of the field, as HOLA 
did in 560.2(c).  Instead, the NBA regulations codify conflict 
preemption.  The NBA regulation contains a savings clause similar to 
HOLA, excepting state contract, tort, criminal, homestead, debt 
collection, taxation, zoning, real property, and any other law that only 
incidentally affects national banks’ real estate lending powers.199   
Conflict preemption occurs when there is an actual conflict 
between state and federal law, such as when compliance with both laws 
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would be a “physical impossibility.”200  Though there was no direct 
conflict between state and federal laws in Barnett Bank v. Nelson—the 
case that produced the standard applied to both NBA and HOLA 
institutions under Dodd-Frank—the state law was still an obstacle to 
accomplishing the federal law’s objectives.201  As a result, the NBA 
preempted that law.  Barnett Bank involves a Florida law prohibiting 
banks from selling insurance, unless the bank is located in a small town 
and not affiliated with a larger institution.202  Barnett Bank bought a 
Florida licensed insurance agency with the plan of selling insurance 
through bank branches in towns with a population of over 5,000, which 
was in violation of the Florida Law.203  The Supreme Court sided with 
Barnett Bank, holding that the Florida law interfered with a power 
explicitly granted by Congress204 and that Florida could not prevent 
banks from engaging in the insurance business.  Even though it did not 
directly contradict federal law, the Florida law was an obstacle to a 
power that Congress intended to grant to national banks.205 
In analyzing whether the NBA preempts state foreclosure laws, 
courts have held that they do not conflict with a federal right and thus 
are not preempted.206  Citing the Supreme Court, the Tamburri court 
holds “[t]he NBA leaves national banks subject to the laws of the State, 
and banks are governed in their daily course of business far more by the 
laws of the State than of the nation.”207  The court also notes the states’ 
“longstanding interest in regulating the foreclosure process.”208  Per the 
Dodd-Frank Act, this analysis should apply to loans made by institutions 
governed by HOLA.  If courts apply the NBA standard to HOLA, 
consumer finance laws as well as state foreclosure laws will not be 
preempted due to the state’s longstanding interest in regulating the 
foreclosure process.  In addition, the scope of authority held by federal 
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thrifts will change and they will face significantly more regulation by 
state entities. 
Although the NBA provides the OCC with less preemptive power, 
preemption was not the only tool used by federal regulators to shelter 
banks from state regulation.209  Notably, nationally chartered banks 
included Bank of America, Citibank, and Wachovia, some of the biggest 
players in the financial collapse.210  Dodd-Frank does not stop the OCC 
from aggressively attempting to quash state regulations, as it did during 
the most recent crisis. 
C. HOLA PREEMPTION IN THE COURTS SINCE DODD-FRANK 
Dodd-Frank does not apply to mortgages signed before the Act 
took effect; thus, homeowners who entered into mortgages before July 
21, 2011 are still unprotected.211  The Act does not alter the applicability 
of prior regulations, but since it clarifies the prior law it should influence 
the interpretation.  However, to date, it is impossible to know what 
impact the Dodd-Frank Act will have on litigation.  Thus far, courts 
continue to follow the judicial interpretations of OTS regulations 
prevalent within the circuit without regard for Dodd-Frank.212  This 
uncertainty and lack of court interpretation is hurtful to homeowners. 
Courts rely on Congress’ failure to make Dodd-Frank retroactive in 
order to avoid an analysis of the Act and the new OCC regulations.  For 
example, in Davis v. World Savings Bank,213 the court does not rely on 
Dodd-Frank or the interim regulations to influence its interpretation of 
HOLA preemption.  The court explained: 
On July 21, 2011, OTS was transferred to the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to a new statute, the Dodd-
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Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 . . . 
.  Effective 90 days after the transfer date, the OTS will be abolished. 
. . .   The Dodd-Frank Act provides that HOLA does not occupy the 
field in any area of state law and that preemption is governed by the 
standards applicable to national banks. . . .  The OCC has issued an 
Interim Final Rule that changes the preemption regulations . . . . The 
new regulation, however, does not govern this case because 
regulations, like statutes, cannot be applied retroactively absent 
express direction from Congress . . . .  Congress did not direct 
retroactive application of the new regulation, and the Dodd-Frank 
Act provided that section 1465 of Title 12 was enacted and amended 
effective on the transfer date, i.e. July 21, 2011. . . .  Section 560.2 
governs here because it was the regulation in effect when the parties 
entered into the Pick-a-Payment mortgage loan transaction.214 
Other cases have followed the Davis analysis, continuing to apply the 
OTS regulations to all loans without considering Dodd-Frank.215 
In Molosky v. Washington Mutual, Inc., the court not only 
confirmed that Dodd-Frank is not retroactive, but also held that HOLA 
preemption still applies to both a bank that originates loans and those 
servicing such loans.216  The Molosky holding reveals that to adequately 
protect the rights of homeowners, courts need further guidance from 
Congress.  For loans signed before July 2011, a lender can still avoid 
state law by merely transferring the loan to a federal entity, acquiring a 
federal entity, or switching its charter.  The Molosky plaintiff did not 
sign a loan with a federal institution, but is subjected to federal 
regulations and foreclosed from adequately asserting state law claims 
simply due to the nature of the institution servicing the loan.217  Such an 
outcome does not protect consumers, enhance the market, or fulfill the 
original intent of HOLA. 
Although NBA regulations and precedent clearly indicate an 
intention to allow states to regulate foreclosures as well as other areas of 
law that are traditionally of special interest to them, in some 
circumstances courts have ignored the spirit of Dodd-Frank and 
continued to adhere to a strict as applied analysis, without regard for 
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harm to homeowners.  Copeland-Turner v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 218 
involves a foreclosure-related action with conversion claims arising out 
of Wells Fargo’s alleged failure to record an assignment, its issuance of 
an invalid notice of default, and its failure to honor an oral agreement to 
stay sales during loan modification and re-application.219  Plaintiffs 
argued that Dodd-Frank’s amendments to HOLA changed the nature 
and analysis of HOLA preemption.220  Citing § 1043 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the court holds that the Act is not meant to apply to contracts 
entered into before enactment.221 
In Sovereign Bank v. Sturgis,222 the U.S. District Court for 
Massachusetts held that HOLA preempted the Massachusetts Consumer 
Credit Cost Disclosure Act, a law regulating disclosures regarding 
credit.223  The court analyzed the statute under OTS regulations without 
mention of the Dodd-Frank Act or consumer financial protection laws, 
holding that since the law purports to impose requirements regarding 
disclosures, it is preempted by HOLA pursuant to 12 C.F.R. 
560.2(b)(9).224  While analyzing the plaintiff’s other claims, the Sturgis 
court followed the prevailing view for pure common law claims, finding 
that a breach of contract claim was not preempted because “courts have 
regularly held that when a federally chartered bank violates a specific 
clause of a mortgage contract, HOLA will not preempt the resulting 
breach of contract claim.”225  When faced with a state consumer 
protection law and common law claims, the Sturgis court engaged in a 
more in-depth analysis relying on OTS opinion letters, but not the 
guidance provided by Dodd-Frank.226 
Dodd-Frank declares that HOLA no longer occupies the field in 
any area of state law, but rather preemption is governed by the standards 
applicable to national banks; it is intended to clarify existing OTS 
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regulations.227  However, courts continue to follow precedent, not the 
congressional advisory.228  This begs the question of whether courts will 
ever apply the same standard to federal thrifts that are applied to 
national banks, or if instead, those facing litigation with a federal thrift 
will be saddled with additional unnecessary steps to adequate recovery.  
To date, it is still unclear what method a court may use to determine 
preemption under the Act.  Presently, courts are continuing to follow 
two distinct standards for HOLA and NBA preemption based on the fact 
that the Dodd-Frank Act is not retroactive.229  Even when a suit 
regarding a loan originating after the effective date comes before a 
court, the court may rely on the spirit and intentions of HOLA, as 
opposed to the NBA, to continue to permit more preemption.  Post-
Dodd-Frank holdings give the impression that courts may never fully 
apply the same standard to federal thrifts that they do to national 
banks.230  This uncertainty does not ensure public access to home 
financing or ensure the solvency of federal savings associations.231 
It is difficult to determine exactly how Dodd-Frank will impact 
residential lending by federal thrifts.  Many existing loans cannot be 
protected by new state laws that aim at curbing subprime lending, robo-
signing, wrongful foreclosure, or other egregious behavior.  Therefore, 
even with the new standards, Dodd-Frank does not fix the problem.  The 
possible conflict preemption analysis, assuming courts and the OCC 
follow the legislative requirements, makes future litigation with thrifts 
difficult for both homeowners and federal thrifts.  Under Dodd-Frank, 
thrifts are unsure if they will have to comply with state or federal 
regulations, while homeowners are still being forced to litigate the most 
egregious mortgages in federal court without state law protection. 
Dodd-Frank has taken steps to prevent another crisis similar to the 
recent meltdown, but it does not address the underlying cause.  In the 
last forty years, the original purpose of HOLA has not been considered.  
Perhaps instead of regulating these institutions, the solution is to repeal 
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the charter or to allow the market to correct itself and eliminate the 
charter. 
IV. THE ELIMINATION OF HOLA BENEFITS ALL PARTIES 
The history of federal thrifts has shown that reforming regulations 
is not enough.  Attempts to protect federal thrifts have resulted in a 
vicious cycle of financial crises, despite regulations developed with the 
intent of protecting the stability of these institutions and preventing 
another meltdown.232  Since the 1970s, thrifts have not made a profit 
without the benefit of protection from the federal government or 
deviation from their original purpose.233  Thus far, all attempts at 
incentivizing banks to maintain the thrift charter have conflicted with 
the purpose of HOLA and caused harm to homeowners.  Dodd-Frank 
attempted to correct the issues of inadequate oversight; however, the Act 
created a regulatory scheme that is vulnerable to the changing political 
climate, just like the financial legislation that preceded it.234 
Due to the political climate and recent history of financial 
regulation, it is vital that the necessity of HOLA-based federal thrifts be 
reevaluated.  The recent crisis has shown that federal thrifts need little to 
no protection.  The market is complex enough, there are numerous 
sources of residential loans, and it is clear that federal thrifts cannot 
compete in the market without favorable treatment by the government.  
Concerns regarding over-regulation and the difficulty of complying with 
multiple states’ rules are unsupported.  It is clear that banks have the 
sophistication to determine which state is best for their interests and 
which forum—state or federal—will result in more favorable litigation 
outcomes.  Even with the removal of the preemption assumption, banks 
may still draw out the litigation process. 
There are numerous reasons to eliminate the federal thrift charter 
and minimize the option of charter shopping.  HOLA no longer serves 
its intended purpose, and in fact impedes the very process it was 
designed to aid.  The mortgage industry will not disappear if federal 
thrifts are eliminated.  However, homeowners will have one less barrier 
to court access.  HOLA is no longer a primary source of lending, but is 
instead a tool for preemption and other trial tactics.  With the remaining 
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federal legislation and entities in place, the federal regulatory scheme 
will continue to exist.  In essence, HOLA is redundant; its benefits, if 
any, are to the lenders and not to the homeowners. 
The sections below outline how the elimination of HOLA would be 
beneficial to homeowners and states, and how banks may be impacted 
by the elimination of the federal thrift charter.  Given that HOLA is no 
longer necessary, eliminating the federal thrift charter may be the best 
solution for all parties.  Homeowners would benefit from consistent 
regulations, easier access to the courts, and adequate remedies for the 
egregious behavior of lenders.  The states would regain some control of 
areas historically within their domain: real estate, consumer protection, 
and the mortgage contract.  Dodd-Frank has eliminated field 
preemption, believed to be the largest perk of the thrift charter, and has 
created an element of uncertainty for the banks.  If the elimination of 
field preemption acts as a de facto repeal of HOLA, then the removal of 
the federal thrift charter will have limited impact on lending institutions. 
A. IMPACT ON HOMEOWNERS 
Home equity is the single largest source of wealth for most 
Americans,235 and for many it accounts for more than 50% of their 
assets.236  Homeowner equity is a critical factor in moving up the 
economic ladder; as a result, the loss of a home can mean complete 
financial ruin for many Americans.  Over the course of the financial 
crisis, Americans lost six trillion dollars in home equity, and as of spring 
2011 more than one in five homes was in a negative equity position.237 
Courts have not only applied HOLA when a federal thrift originates 
the loan and initiates foreclosure, but also when a federal thrift 
originates the loan but the thrift is later sold, or when a federal thrift 
merely services a loan.238  These changes are outside the control of the 
homeowner, who has no say in the negotiations of the mortgage sale or 
the selection of the servicing entity.  Yet, homeowners’ rights change 
after the execution of the contract in a way that is extremely detrimental.  
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Homeowners do not bargain for a federal court battle when they enter 
into a mortgage with a state thrift that later transfers its charter, nor is 
the average homeowner sophisticated enough to know the ramifications 
of entering into a mortgage with a federal thrift.  Thus, a homeowner 
dealing with foreclosure should not be forced into federal court.  When 
faced with the prospect of losing the most significant measure of their 
wealth, homeowners should be able to rely on longstanding state 
foreclosure procedures and common law protections. 
The resources necessary to fight a mortgage company in federal 
court can be overwhelming, even when the bank is at fault.  For the 
homeowner, foreclosure or any legal conflict with a bank is a complex 
and frustrating process.  This, in part, is due to the nature of lending.  
The mortgage lender is the financial institution that lends the 
homeowner money, while the mortgage servicer handles the day-to-day 
tasks of managing a loan. A loan servicer typically processes loan 
payments, responds to borrower inquiries, keeps track of principal and 
interest paid, manages an escrow account, and may initiate foreclosure.  
The servicer may or may not be the same company that issued the loan.  
In a case of foreclosure, a bank may transfer a note to a trustee to handle 
the sale, adding yet another party to the equation. 
If any party in such a case is a federal institution, federal 
preemption may be invoked under HOLA and the NBA.  While courts 
generally agree that the NBA does not preempt foreclosure law,239 this 
does not stop regulators from invoking preemption, nor does it prevent 
the OCC from deterring states from taking action against financial 
institutions.240  As established in Dodd-Frank, the CFPB should fill the 
gap in consumer protection if federal regulators are going to attempt to 
utilize supremacy to let federal institutions avoid compliance with state 
laws.  Unfortunately, to date, the actions of the Bureau have not risen to 
the same level of protection that a consumer could receive from a 
state.241  Federal regulation of financial institutions and instruments is 
complex, but at the homeowner level, the desires are simpler.  
Homeowners need a straightforward process for recovery and redress 
when conflicts arise with their lenders.  If homeowners face protracted 
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litigation against a federal thrift, they risk losing their homes and are 
saddled with large legal bills. 
The argument that the existence of different levels of regulation 
harms federal thrifts is not persuasive, as banks and thrifts are already 
subject to state specific contract, tort, property, and other claims.  This 
argument is especially unpersuasive in light of HOLA’s purpose.  
HOLA was not drafted to create and preserve an institution, nor was it 
created as a profit source for the banking industry.  Since the 1970s, 
federal thrifts have moved away from their intended purpose and have 
instead focused on competition, profits, and survival.242  Savings and 
loans claim they need uniform laws to stay afloat, yet such uniformity 
has not worked to prevent market collapse.  Federal thrifts should not be 
given the privilege of uniformity, including access to a federal forum, 
when it is the homeowner that has suffered and bore the brunt of the 
recent crisis.  This outcome is precisely the opposite of what HOLA 
originally intended. 
Banks and thrifts are sophisticated and have more bargaining power 
than homeowners, who secure loans from whichever institution offers 
the lowest interest rate, or in this market, who will provide them a 
mortgage at all.  Consumers do not have the option of refusing a loan 
based on the fact that an institution is a federal thrift that will subject 
them to litigation in federal court in the event of a dispute.  Thus, 
homeowners are not in a fair bargaining position, even with the creation 
of the CFBP and other changes to the market initiated by Dodd-Frank.  
The elimination of the HOLA-based thrift charter, as well as any 
corresponding regulatory measures taken to keep the thrifts solvent, will 
provide relief for homeowners beyond what is attempted by Dodd-
Frank. 
B. IMPACT ON STATES 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that “[p]roperty interests 
are created and defined by state law.”243  Unlike most scenarios in which 
forum shopping may arise, a real property plaintiff typically only has 
two choices—state or federal—because a state has dominion and control 
of the property within its borders.244  Unlike torts and other causes of 
action, only federal preemption can override a state’s ability to hear a 
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case involving a property claim within its territory.  Therefore, charter 
shopping and preemption by a federal institution can infringe not only 
on a plaintiff’s rights, but on a state’s rights as well. 
A state has the ability to be progressive or conservative and to 
contradict national trends if it is the will of its citizens.  Due to full faith 
and credit,245 state regulations have the power to create sweeping 
reforms.  In the case of banking, a bank’s ability to switch charters, or 
even change the character of its institution, creates a market-based check 
on state overregulation.  If state regulations are overly restrictive, a bank 
can choose to avoid the market altogether—a prospect that could be 
catastrophic to a state’s economy.  Thus, the market provides both an 
incentive to lend and an incentive for states to strike a regulatory 
balance.  Federal involvement is not necessary to encourage either the 
banks or the states.  In the recent meltdown, even as signs of an 
impending housing crisis appeared and states attempted to curb the 
impact, banks did not cease to engage in residential lending in the face 
of action by the states.  Instead, institutions switched charters and used 
their resources to fight attorney generals, deny homeowner access to the 
courts, and influence regulators.246 
The federal government has proven that it is slow to react to 
changes in the residential mortgage industry, and that the changing tides 
in Washington can have a major impact on its regulation of mortgage 
servicing.247  The OCC and CFPB, which have a dual incentive to 
preserve banking and protect consumers, are slow to react and operate in 
a hostile climate.  Dodd-Frank conformed HOLA to NBA preemption; 
however, to date the OCC regulations have not fully eliminated all of 
the preemptive preferences outlined in the HOLA regulations.248  
Further, while the CFPB has been tasked with filling the gaps in 
consumer protection regulations within the federal system, to date there 
are no federal regulations in existence to mirror the state causes of 
action that are still preempted by HOLA.249  Meanwhile, states continue 
to face preemption in connection with some of the worst mortgages due 
to Dodd-Frank’s failure to apply retroactively. 
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States have proven that they are capable of adapting to an 
impending crisis faster than the federal government.  In the face of 
opposition from the OTS and OCC, many states continued to advance 
legislation to regulate financial institutions.  In 1999, North Carolina 
passed legislation establishing a 5% fee trigger—a rate 3% lower than 
the federal regulations—that designated a loan as high risk and 
subjected it to state regulation.  North Carolina’s act also banned 
prepayment penalties for mortgages under $150,000 and prohibited loan 
flipping (repeated refinancing).250  Eventually, the OCC joined the 
OTS’s efforts to restrain state activities in regulations issued in 2004.  In 
2006 alone, state attorney generals launched more than 3,000 
enforcement actions.251  States also teamed up to produce large 
settlements with banks.  In the face of HOLA preemption, other states 
followed North Carolina, and by 2007, twenty-nine states and the 
District of Columbia had passed anti-predatory lending legislation.252  
Instead of changing their behavior, banks and thrifts relied on 
preemption to evade state legislation, thus worsening the impact of the 
financial crisis.  When homeowners filed suit against lenders pursuant to 
state legislation aimed at combating wrongful lending practices, thrifts 
and national banks raised preemption as a defense, thereby prolonging 
litigation and usurping state control. 
It is clear from HOLA’s intent that the OTS has overstepped its 
bounds, and that legislative efforts to keep thrifts afloat have completely 
shifted the focus.  The mortgage crisis proved that banking and 
securities regulations are subject to the whims of politics.  For example, 
an era of deregulation led to the lingering financial crisis, which was in 
part caused by a historical number of mortgage defaults and 
foreclosures.  With much of state revenues linked to the value of 
property, particularly in states that do not have an income tax, OTS and 
OCC regulations have resulted in a catastrophic impact on state 
revenues.  Congress never intended for the OTS to preempt state laws 
with regulations and then fail to enact similar protections for consumers.  
Unfortunately, the OTS had no incentive to enact consumer protection 
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legislation—particularly since the budget of the OTS is funded with fees 
paid by the very banks it regulated. 
Real estate law has always varied from state to state, but this 
variation has not impacted access to credit to date.  States are financially 
incentivized to protect homeowners because many states rely on 
property taxes as a primary source of revenue.  As a result, it is in a 
state’s interest to prevent foreclosures because it is inevitable that they 
will impact property values, impose costs on state and local 
governments, and lead to an increase in crime.  States cannot create 
money like the federal government, with access to the Federal Reserve, 
and in times of economic crisis, states encounter the same limited 
availability of credit and higher interest rates as private citizens and 
entities.  In addition, the recent crisis proves that industries and lobbyists 
induce federal regulators to create lax regulations that cause harm to 
consumers.  At the very least this influence slows down the process of 
developing reforms, and at its worst it can leave homeowners 
completely unprotected.  Thus, states are in the best position to 
implement laws to protect the interests of homeowners within their 
jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the problem is not a particular agency.253  An analysis of 
the most recent crisis indicates that the problem may be federal 
intervention within areas that are better regulated by the states.  While 
preemption is based on a determination of congressional intent to 
displace the police power of states, the recent use of HOLA to avoid 
state court efforts to stall foreclosures and police high risk practices of 
lenders warrants a reexamination of the Homeowner’s Loan Act.  The 
OTS declaration of field preemption places a federal agency in control 
of an area better suited, and many would argue, intended to be state-
controlled.  Dodd-Frank subjects thrifts to conflict preemption; however, 
the Act does not consider whether federal intervention is necessary at all 
or if the thrift is an institution worth preserving.  The drafters ignored 
the default presumption against preemption254 and instead sought to 
create a less damaging regime.  The outcome of the financial crisis 
confirms that the federal thrifts’ interest in maintaining consistent 
regulations does not outweigh a state’s desire to curb predatory lending 
                                                                                                                 
 253. Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Requiem for a Regulator: the Office of 
Thrift Supervision’s Performance During the Financial Crisis, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1777, 
1780 (2011). 
 254. For a discussion of federalism and preemption, see infra Part I. 
2013] HOLA PREEMPTION 609 
or other high-risk behavior in the interest of economic stability.  Conflict 
preemption may not provide states with adequate authority to regulate 
thrifts, as demonstrated by the actions of the OCC.  Banks should not 
have the option to charter shop or forum shop in the face of state 
attempts at regulation that are still more restrictive and punitive than 
federal equivalents. 
Because states are quicker to react to changes in the lending market 
and have an interest in controlling issues related to real estate 
transactions within their borders, state actions should not be preempted.  
The solution is simple in light of HOLA’s purpose: HOLA should be 
eliminated.  This will provide the states with the authority they need to 
protect homeowners, real estate values, and revenue.  Through the 
repeal of HOLA states will regain some of the control necessary to 
prevent another crisis, or at least lessen the impact of negative 
influences on the residential real estate market. 
C. IMPACT ON BANKS 
Since the 1970s, federal thrifts have fought a losing battle to 
maintain market share and remain profitable.  Competition from non-
bank lenders, unrestricted by federal banking rules, has created a market 
in which it is difficult for federal thrifts to survive without government 
intervention.  The growth of the “shadow banking” system allowed 
institutions performing the same market functions as banks to escape 
regulation due to their corporate structure, while banks and thrifts used 
subsidiaries within the shadow banking system to move activities off 
balance sheet and outside the reach of more stringent regulation.255  It is 
nearly impossible for thrifts to remain solvent because hedge funds, 
investment banks, brokerage funds, and other institutions have been 
allowed to offer the same financial products without the restrictions that 
thrifts face.  The recent crisis has proven that the remedy is not to 
expand the scope of control for large banks and thrifts—such as 
engaging in the same practices as non-deposit taking financial 
institutions—which creates perverse incentives by creating “too-big-to-
fail” institutions.256 
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The savings and loan crisis of the 1980s proved that eliminating the 
restrictions on federal thrifts does not increase solvency.  FIRREA’s 
changes to HOLA, as well as the adoption of uniform governance and a 
strong jurisdictional preference for thrifts through field preemption, also 
failed to prevent a near-collapse.  This phenomenon does not indicate a 
need for looser federal guidelines or the creation of additional incentives 
to entice banks to hold federal thrift charters.  Instead, it is evidence that 
the economic situation that prompted the development of HOLA has 
disappeared, and that the thrift charter is no longer necessary to stabilize 
residential lending. 
Under Dodd-Frank, all aspects of a financial institution, regardless 
of the form, will be subject to federal oversight under the CFPB.  Many 
argue that the additional oversight proposed by Dodd-Frank outweighs 
any benefits of maintaining a thrift charter, particularly in the absence of 
field preemption.  This is particularly true for institutions that relied on 
subsidiary preemption to extend field preemption to other aspects of 
their business.  It is possible that in the face of competition from non-
bank institutions and with the option of switching to a state charter, the 
Dodd-Frank changes will act to eliminate the federal thrift charter purely 
through economic forces. 
There have always been disadvantages to maintaining a federal 
thrift charter; yet, at the height of the era of lending that sparked the 
financial crisis, federal thrift loans accounted for as many as one third of 
all mortgage loans originated in the U.S.257  This may be because the 
OTS allowed federal thrifts to engage in activities unrelated to 
residential lending and to enjoy protection of deposits by the FDIC, 
while not being subject to states’ attempts to minimize the impact of the 
crisis or homeowners’ attempts to recover under state laws.258  With 
these perks eliminated, much of what remains after Dodd-Frank are the 
downsides of maintaining a thrift charter.  Federal thrifts continue to 
face a lending limit for commercial loans equal to 20% of total assets,259 
as well as a cap on nonresidential real property loans set at 400% of 
capital.260  Thrifts are also prohibited from making secured consumer 
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loans and from holding commercial paper and corporate debt securities 
in excess of 35% of their assets.261  Although under the purview of the 
CFPB, non-bank lenders are not subjected to restrictions of this 
magnitude, even following the economic collapse.  Dodd-Frank also 
codifies the Supreme Court holding in Cuomo v. Clearing House 
Association262 in §1047 of the Act, which will likely increase actions by 
state attorney generals against institutions to enforce compliance with 
non-preempted state laws.  Although attorney general enforcement is 
somewhat limited by the Dodd-Frank Act, the codification of Cuomo 
will increase actions for reasons beyond the restrictions.263 
Thus, while the only clear protection in Dodd-Frank applies to state 
consumer protection laws, it is possible that Dodd-Frank will work to 
eliminate the federal thrift because of its stance on preemption.  The 
uncertainty alone may cause banks to abandon the federal thrift charter.   
To determine whether the thrift charter is worthwhile, banks must 
determine whether the preemption standard of Dodd-Frank will provide 
adequate protection from state regulation of activities.  However, after 
decades of relaxed restrictions, it is evident that the banks do not need 
the ability to choose between federal and state thrifts.  The institutions 
do not need an incentive to engage in residential lending.  HOLA was 
drafted to provide a funding resource for homeowners, not a shelter for 
the banks. 
CONCLUSION 
The refrain “too big to fail” is frequently used in reference to the 
size of financial institutions and the impact that their failure would have 
on the economy.  Analysts attest that allowing the collapse of these 
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institutions would have led to an even more catastrophic economic 
crisis.  The Dodd-Frank Act is now necessary to prevent a similar crisis 
from occurring.  However, legislation does not address the tools that the 
government gave to institutions in the interest of preventing the failures 
that contributed to the collapse.  In the last two decades, HOLA 
preemption became a weapon against litigation by homeowners. 
Many feel that deregulation and expansive preemption are at least 
partially responsible for the severity of the housing crisis.  Allowing 
financial institutions to choose between state and federal charters with 
varying degrees of regulations worked to the detriment of all parties 
involved, with the homeowner bearing the brunt of the injury.  Federal 
institutions took advantage of supremacy and competed directly with 
states for the business of banks.  In response, states were forced to 
expend resources to fight federal overstepping and to compete with the 
federal government to maintain state institutions.  Then, when the 
system began to fail, banks took advantage of a combination of relaxed 
federal laws and confusion stemming from uncertainty on which of the 
numerous institutions were actually responsible. 
Federal thrifts do not stabilize the housing market, but instead have 
contributed to two major financial crises.  Therefore, if federal thrifts 
cannot survive in the market without incentives from the federal 
government, they should be allowed to fail.  Federal thrifts no longer 
serve their original purpose and instead act counter to that purpose.  By 
repealing the federal thrift, the residential lending market will be 
simplified for the consumer.  The states will have one less obstacle to 
overcome in promoting consumer protection and other laws favorable to 
homeowners.  Banks may also benefit from the elimination of a source 
of uncertainty in a climate of extensive reforms.  Because state laws can 
adequately protect homeowners, and many of the perks of maintaining a 
federal thrift have been removed, it is in the best interest of all parties to 
eliminate the federal thrift charter. 
 
